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1             ANIMALS AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL IN RECENT THEODICIES
    
    The problem of evil is unanswered and puzzling to the majority of philosophers and Christian 
theists who address theodicy, and in the way it is articulated, the question cannot be truly 
resolved.  The answers conceive God according to Biblical traditions, as if we can comprehend 
the full meanings of total omnipotence, all loving and all knowing.  If God exists and these three 
attributes are aspects of his being or essence, then why is there moral and nonmoral evil in the 
world?  Why does he not prevent it?
  Firstly, this paper shall question and discuss only a few of John Hick’s flaws in his theodicy 
because the late Roland Puccetti has attacked many of his problems and fallacies in his well 
argued paper “The Loving God—Some Observations on John Hick’s Evil and God of Love.”1 
More importantly, we shall explore why a loving powerful God permits suffering, pain, and early 
deaths to millions of animals for seemingly no reason.  Richard Swinburne’s response and the 
answers of process theodicy are also critically addressed. This paper argues that if God exists, his 
love for humanity does not entail loving each and every human, just as our love for some animal 
species  does  not  necessitate  loving  every  single  animal.  Considered  this  way,  God’s  love 
1 Puccetti, R. (April, 1967). The loving God – some observations on John Hick’s Evil and the God of love. Religious 
Studies, (2), p.260.
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2(assuming it exists) is primarily general, not particular. This new radical mode of thinking is 
contrary to traditional theism, and is capable of explaining all human and animal misery and 
deaths throughout  time.  This  perspective is  argued at  the end of  the paper.  Firstly,  we shall 
address Hick’s basic theodicy, briefly, and then his answers to animal evil.
Hick’s Approach to Theodicy
     Hick developed a rather new theodicy which has been the subject of much constructive 
criticism.  As he states, his task is one of faith seeking an understanding; to preserve one’s faith 
from being overcome by the problem of evil.  A worthy goal, but we should challenge the 
premise that evil does not render faith irrational.  Hick’s agenda is to look toward the distant 
future to explain the mystery of evil, rather than to the past—the Fall—through Augustine’s 
vision.  Humans are not finished beings, but rather still in the process of creation, of fulfillment 
into a finite likeness of God in his vision.  Drawing from St. Paul and Irenaeus, Hick envisions 
humankind on a long spiritual journey toward eventual perfection, but we still have a very long 
road ahead.  The Bible, he believes, clearly shows that humans are not in a finished state. His 
Irenaen hypothesis is that humans are in the process of soul-making to become children of God 
and this explains the considerable amount of evil in the world.
     Modestly, Hick admits “…so far as we can see, the soul-making process does in fact fail in 
our own world at least as often as it succeeds.”2  But the skeptic can easily argue that the soul-
making process, assuming it exists, fails far more than it succeeds.  Moreover, as Puccetti points 
out, Hick’s admission that so much human suffering is a mystery hardly helps resolve this crisis 
of evil.  Puccetti’s attacks to Hick’s argument are on target, so that it is unnecessary to repeat 
them.  Similarly, William Rowe’s criticisms of Hick’s position are also accurate.  He accepts part 
2 Hick, J. (1966). Evil and the God of love. New York: Harper & Row, p.372.
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3of Hick’s argument, but I deny it entirely.  Rowe concludes “…we must judge Hick’s own 
theodicy as falling substantially short of its goal…when we turn to our final two problems—the 
explanation of the amount and degree of intrinsic evil, and the explanation of particular evils—I 
believe Hick’s theodicy, like all other theodicies, fails to offer any believable solution.” 3 
However, we should not accept Rowe’s assertion that Hick provides a reasonable answer to the 
question of why God would permit any evil, nor can we accept his answer to why God allows 
different kinds of evil that are excessive and unrelated to the soul-making process.  God’s higher 
goal to create morally superior humans need not justify permitting the Holocaust, Black Death, 
Inquisition, and innumerable other deaths and pain. Similarly, it need not justify suffering of 
lower magnitude, such as disease and mental anguish because humans are capable of and have 
become morally superior without personal suffering.
     Rowe and Puccetti both point out fallacious argument, e.g., an “all or nothing” or false 
dichotomy in Hick’s work.  The problem is that God could and should have limited the human 
propensity for evil, at least slightly, and could have prevented even a minority of natural disasters 
or their effects, and there would still be more than ample opportunity to develop morally virtuous 
souls and God’s Plan would still work.  As Puccetti points out, he (and other skeptics) never 
expected the world to be a hedonistic paradise.4
     Obviously, some evil is necessary (inevitable) in the world, but the magnitude of a Katrina 
disaster, AIDS, or especially the Holocaust are not needed so that humans can develop sympathy, 
appreciate happiness, and/or form superior souls. Numerous virtuous people have developed fine 
“superior souls” with love and altruistic caring without experiencing great pain and evils. Others 
3  Rowe, W. (1991).  Paradox and promise: Hick’s solution to the problem of evil.  In H.Hewitt, Jr. (Ed.) Problems in 
the philosophy of religion: critical studies in the work of John Hick (p.122) New York: St. Martin’s Press.
4  Puccetti, The loving God – Some observations on John Hick’s Evil and the God of love p. 260.
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4experience great pain or terrible evils and become criminals, or at least never develop “superior 
souls”. Millions of individuals cannot (or do not) pass on their experiences so that others may 
learn from them, especially the next generation. Theists claim that human lives 
are richer for the suffering they endure, but even assuming that is true, (depending how ‘richer’ is 
defined), it still can not justify every slaughtered person and all human anguish throughout time. 
The victims and survivors of the Holocaust were in no way better for the hardships they endured. 
Some theists claim that God might have prevented countless evils in such a mysterious way that 
it is beyond human knowledge. However, this return to faith is based solely on pure speculation 
and is not acceptable. 
     Some human evils are believed to be justifiable as divine retribution for sins, among other 
reasons, but there seems no justification for animal evils. These innocent creatures have no sense 
of good and evil and their suffering is without meaning.
Hick on Animal Suffering
     My major purpose here is to question fundamentally why so many animals must suffer 
with(and even without) pain unnecessarily and why so many millions must die before their 
normal life spans, assuming an all-loving, omniscient and omnipotent God. Again, Hick’s 
comments are not very assuaging, contrary to Puccetti, who writes:
   Hick has quite a few assuaging things to say on animal pain.  The lower species are probably 
not even conscious; higher vertebrates other than men are mostly doomed to die violently, as 
parts of a self-sustaining organic system; animals have a ‘happy blindness’ to the inevitability of 
death, which is therefore not a problem to them; animals live from ‘instant to instant’ merely, and 
cannot carry their past experience with them in conscious memory…5
5 Ibid. p.261
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5     In the first place, numerous lower species are conscious, depending on how ‘conscious’ is 
defined. The traditional Cartesian view that holds that animals have no feelings is erroneous. Let 
us assume it is a being that is aware of its surroundings and has simple desires, basic needs and 
interests.  Although not all philosophers agree that animals have simple beliefs and desires, much 
empirical evidence suggests that many animals do, in fact. We will assume that being conscious 
does not imply self-consciousness or reflective thinking among animals.  They have their own 
projects and interests and though unlike ours, they try to survive satisfactorily, relative to the 
given situation. Their desires may seem meaningless or unimportant to us, just as some human 
goals and projects seem unimportant to God as well as other people.  Scientific studies show that 
many species experience at least simple levels of consciousness. The search for neural  
correlates of consciousness have not discovered any consciousness producing structure or 
process limited to human brains.  For instance, some birds exhibit all the objective attributes of 
episodic memory, crows can creatively make tools, apes and parrots can answer complex 
questions and make requests 6.  It is also highly likely that conscious animals, such as reptiles, 
can experience at least simple and perhaps intense pains.  Pain thresholds can be measured in 
animals by the appearance of escape behavior. The pain detection threshold level seems to be the 
same in both humans and other vertebrates, and is affected by analgesics only when the pain can 
be no longer tolerated, according to David DeGrazia. Although this is speculative, pain may well 
6 Recent strong evidence suggests that animals such as chimps and scrub jays, have episodic memory and are able to 
plan for the future.  Although it is often difficult to measure or understand animal thinking, it seems like that they 
can remember and recall past events, as well as knowledge about the world.  Chimps can remember where food is 
hidden outside their enclosures.  This experiment confirms common sense and ordinary observations. Dolphins use 
tools and have unusually large brains, four times the size of chimpanzees. Some scientists believe that they show 
evidence of self-consciousness by recognizing themselves in a mirror.
Moreover, many species, such as felines, canines and primates exhibit a trivial freewill through their movement and 
play. 
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6be a product of the development of consciousness in creatures that have noceceptive pathways.7 
It is very evident, then, that some animals, including members of many lower species, can 
experience much pain and suffering.  The distinction is that one can experience pain, such as a 
pin prick without suffering, and one can suffer mentally and physically without feeling direct 
pain. Suffering can include boredom, anxiety, fear, worry and loneliness. Empirical evidence 
shows that most or all mammals and vertebrates are capable of experiencing states of anxiety.
    Most animals are violently killed and devoured by other species which, in the economy of 
nature, live by preying upon them.  The animal kingdom forms a vast self-sustaining organism in 
which every part becomes, directly or indirectly, food for another part---its situation must seem 
agonizing indeed…whilst feeling evils of which it is not conscious.8
Yet they are very often conscious of the evils that are suffered.  The fact that most wild animals 
die violently from predators (predation) and natural disasters within the chain of nature is not 
assuaging at all, nor does it justify their countless deaths, contrary to Hick and Swinburne.  An 
absolutely omnipotent God would be capable of creating and sustaining all possible natural 
worlds. Omnipotent shall be defined as capable of doing anything that is not logically 
impossible. The total power and knowledge of this hypothetical God is all encompassing, 
immense, and beyond our imagination. Contrary to Leibniz, God did not create the best of all 
possible worlds, but he would have known of them, and could have designed nature so that less 
carnivores and more vegetarian species exist as well as a larger number of plants to feed them. 
Animal bodies could have been structured to suffer less pain and fewer deaths. The entire 
ecological system could have been greatly different.  Theoretically, an infinite number of 
possibilities could have been designed for animals throughout the past and present natural 
77  DeGrazia, D., Rowan, A. (1991). Pain, suffering, and anxiety in animals and humans. Theoretical Medicine, 12, 
pp.197-199, 201
8
8.  Hick,  Evil and the God of love, p.349.
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7worlds. Given all the possible combinations for human physiology, human bodies could have 
been designed with less taste for animal meat, so that animals would not be hunted and 
slaughtered by the millions, and humans could easily flourish on a dairy and vegetarian diet.  (I 
am certainly not arguing for vegetarianism, only to suggest the original possibilities for an all 
powerful divine being.)  Of course, animal reproduction could be greatly diminished, life spans 
would increase, and there would be far fewer animal lives spent in pointless futility and dying 
young.
Hick then argues,
Not only is the animal’s experience not shadowed by any anticipation of death or by any 
sense of its awesome finality; it is likewise simplified, in comparison with human consciousness, 
by a happy blindness to the dangers and pains that may lie between the present moment and this 
inevitable termination; and again by a similar oblivion to the past.9 
     Death, supposedly, is not a problem to them. True, animals, as far as we know, do not realize 
that death is inevitable, but it does not follow that it is not a problem. Observations show that 
when animals are close to death, they can sense or feel their lives in grave danger. Some sense 
that they are too sick or injured to go on. They do not know why, but they have some awareness 
that something is very wrong with their bodies. Animal minds cannot be known, of course, but 
the large amount of anecdotal evidence is much more than mere conjecture. Philosophers who 
minimize or reject the suffering and awareness of animals have not observed them very closely. 
For instance, deaths of matriarchs and baby elephants elicit much grieving behavior as mourning 
is an integral aspect of their culture.10 In addition, some members of animal species instinctively
plan for the future. Their behavior often indicates that they are aware, generally, of yesterdays 
and tomorrows.11  
9 Ibid.
10 Bradshaw, I.G.A. (2004). Not by bread alone: symbolic loss, trauma, and recovery in elephant communities. 
Society and Animals, 12:2, 145-147.      
11 Clayton, N.S., Bussey,T. J., Dickinson, A.  (August 2003)  Can animals recall the past and plan for the future? 
Neuroscience, 4, pp. 685-87.
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8    Contrary to Hick, the subject of animal pain is not largely speculative and theoretical as he 
states, not even in 1966 when his book was published. Animal pain is very real, and we are not 
merely transferring our emotions to the animal. Perhaps it is because animals cannot cry as we 
do that so many people fail to understand their suffering. Their pained expressions sufficiently 
resemble the looks we associate with human pain and discomfort. Moreover, much evidence 
demonstrates that domestic animals in shelters exhibit clear signs of depression, sadness and 
loneliness, and even the most cheerful objective observer notices that phenomenon. Otherwise, 
one might object that the depressed observer is projecting his or her feelings to the animal. 
Besides, skeptics of this point of view would be expressing their lack of empathy toward 
animals. 
    Consider this hypothetical example. Suppose an alien species visited earth and were unable to 
understand human languages. When humans were suffering, the aliens would have to rely on 
physiological examinations and observations of them in pain or distress. The presence of 
hospitals and doctors still does not persuade them. The fact that humans suffer maladies and 
accidents would not prove subjective pain sensations. Suppose that even their advanced tests and 
technology could not totally prove the existence of real human pain. Their skeptics would 
demand absolute proof, and might claim that the lower primates experience no pain and do not 
possess full consciousness. In any case, they would argue that they cannot understand the human 
mind and it is beyond their comprehension. Some observers are indifferent to the whole problem. 
Besides, most of them are incapable of empathy or compassion toward the human creatures. This 
illustration implies that our ignorance of some non-human species does not mean that they do not 
suffer in pain, nor can we conclude that they have a significantly lower status in the universe-
wide realm and to God’s mind. 
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9   Moreover, it suggests (but does not entail) that if and when members of an intelligent species 
can alleviate the suffering of members of another sentient species with no harm to themselves, 
then they should do so. Jeremy Bentham rightly argued that our shared bond with animals is the 
capacity to suffer. Assuming that this is true, we can state that for broad utilitarian reasons, 
humans should exercise empathy to prevent and relieve animal suffering and pain, thereby 
allowing the creature to survive in comfort, when possible. Relieving suffering can include 
mercy killing only when truly necessary. This normative rule includes an increase in the sum 
total of pleasures for the species.  Mill argues that “our feeling for humanity” establishes the 
reasoning or basis for utilitarianism, and here it also includes a feeling for sentient members of 
higher species.
                                   Swinburne on Animal Suffering
     Richard Swinburne in Providence and the Problem of Evil has attempted to justify the 
suffering and deaths of animals by arguing that it is necessary for some of them to get caught in a 
forest fire, using William Rowe’s much discussed fawn example, so that others can be warned to 
avoid the fires. “Fawns are bound to get caught in forest fires sometimes if other fawns are to 
have the opportunity of intentionally avoiding fires, and if deer are to have opportunities of 
rescuing other fawns from fires.”12 
  The fact is that fawns and members of numerous other species are warned by their natural 
instincts by the sight and smell of smoke or fire to avoid going in, and so it is unnecessary to 
witness other deer or animals caught and suffer in them. Similarly, such animals instinctively 
know better than to jump over cliffs, fall into earthquakes and avoid other dangers. Basic 
scientific and amateur observations of animal behavior including pets demonstrate that. He is 
12 Swinburne, R. (1998) Providence and the problem of evil.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. p.172.
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right that “you cannot intentionally avoid forest fires or take trouble to rescue your offspring 
from forest fires, unless there exists a serious danger of getting caught in fires”,13 but from this 
does not follow that animals must see others caught to avoid the fires  themselves. 
     Furthermore, he argues that bad actions like physical pain provide opportunities for good 
actions to be done in response, such as courage, sympathy, and caring among animals.  However, 
pain would be without significance or meaning to animals incapable of having beliefs. We can 
add that the pain may be just as intense, but the animal could not understand or give it any 
meaning. This pain and suffering would not be justified, he says, except for the useful good to 
other animals, such as behaving sympathetically. However, I believe that this is irrelevant to the 
pain suffered. First, animals cannot understand this possible tradeoff or compensation between 
pain and courage and it seemingly makes no difference to God or them. Secondly, animal souls 
are not in any way developed or created, most likely, for an ascent to Heaven. Few theists believe 
animal souls (if they exist) have a place in the afterlife either in immortality or for a long 
duration. Thirdly, God could have created their brains so that courage and caring, for instance, 
could be developed utilizing other behavioral patterns without seriously endangering their lives.
     John Hick argues in his book review that Swinburne might be projecting a human state of 
mind into animals. As he argues, merely because the survival instinct causes a wounded lion to 
struggle to live, it does not then mean that they are experiencing the human quality of courage.14 
Swinburne probably did not mean that, exactly, but animal “courage” is certainly not human 
courage, and we have no way of understanding all their mental states, especially cognition.  Hick 
is also right to question Swinburne’s project of matching every bad state with a good state of 
which it is a necessary condition, in that this requires very counter-intuitive moral judgments. 
13 Ibid.
14 Hick, J. (F 2000) Review of Providence and the problem of evil, by Swinburne, R.  International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion, 47:1, p. 60.
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That is, it breaks with common sense. Clearly, this is not a fatal flaw, but it certainly weakens his 
argument. 
     Swinburne goes further to argue that the killing of one animal by another for food is not itself 
a natural evil. “To be killed and eaten by another animal is as natural an end to life as would be 
death by other natural causes at the same age”.15 Perhaps, but it is not metaphysically necessary, 
and it is an evil to the animal insofar as it experiences and seeks pleasures and there are strong 
sufficient reasons for us to believe it is an evil. For instance, the destruction of elephants. The 
pain of being devoured is an evil in the animal’s small mind (unless it was already near death), 
because its life suddenly ends.  Instinctively, the animal senses that an awful death is immediate 
and it struggles to escape. Its sensory pleasures and other creature comforts are over much too 
soon. Higher animals, such as horses, can feel the anguish. It may be natural, but Swinburne 
cannot know, nor anyone else, that it is not an evil. Besides, to say it is merely the end of a good 
is a gross understatement because if is argued that life is a good, then the end of life is surely a 
non-good.
     Swinburne argues that “the world would be much the poorer without the courage of a 
wounded lion continuing to struggle despite its wound, the courage of the deer in escaping from 
the lion.”16  Animal lives have far greater value for the heroism they show. But Philip Quinn 
rightly argues in his book review that Swinburne gives us no assurance that this good alone will 
always outweigh their suffering.17  I strongly agree that it is wildly counterintuitive, as he 
facetiously says, to suppose that chickens benefit from their suffering. They do not freely accept 
it; nor does it improve their character. It is also farfetched to claim that their misery is justifiable 
15 Swinburne, R. Providence and the problem of evil.  p. 182. See also Tattersall, N. (1998) The evidential argument 
from evil. P.8      www.infidels.org/library/modern/nicholas_tattersall/evil.html
16
 Ibid. 173
17 Quinn, P.L. (July 2001) Review of Providence and the problem of evil, Swinburne, R., Faith and Philosophy 18: 
3, p.397. July.
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because it gives farmers the free choice whether or not to relieve their suffering. The animal’s 
life is not richer for the complexity and difficulty of their daily struggles and hardships, as 
Swinburne states. Richer or better for whom, humans or animals? Most humans are indifferent or 
unaware of these daunting hardships which existed eons before the first human walked the 
earth. He is correct that we have no right to cause animals to suffer, but if God has that right and 
exercises it, then we must question his love for all creatures, great and small. Swinburne is right 
to suggest that our compassion for sentient animals is too narrow and restricted.
Process Thought on Animal Suffering
     Process thought, developed from the philosophy of Whitehead and Hartshorne, attempts to 
justify an answer to animal suffering by arguing that animals do not act according to God’s 
desires because God can only persuade and not coerce animals and humans.  I will address only 
Gary Chartier’s consequentialist answer in his lengthy complex article because it offers the best 
hope for a process theodicy. The (process theorist’s) non-consequentialist view denies that God 
wills any predation, and requires an explanation why animals resist divine persuasion against 
predation, or else why God does not attempt divine persuasion with animals. This view seems to 
me very problematic and probably untenable. Chartier’s own views are not always clear because 
he distances his ideas by writing from the viewpoint of the process thinker. Chartier says that 
“the process thinker can opt for a consequentialist account of divine goodness…thus she can 
maintain that acts of predation can contribute to evolutionary advance, that God wills at least 
some such acts to foster evolutionary advance, and that God’s decision to do so is consistent with 
belief in God’s goodness…”18     The process thinker concedes that God’s power is limited 
18 Chartier, G.  (2006)  Non-human animals and process theodicy. Religious Studies, 42, p.21.
Predation is the killing and consuming of animals in the wild.
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because he can only persuade, not force beings, and therefore reduces his omnipotence.  God 
might try to guide the deer away from the forest fire, for instance, but all the events leading up to 
the fire might not respond to God’s wishes. Thus, the process thinker’s God does not possess 
total power, and as such, her position does not provide a genuine answer to the traditional 
problem of evil which holds that God is totally omnipotent. God is “perfectly powerful” yet has 
limited powers, and even atoms are beyond his control. Secondly, evolutionary advance, which 
“embodies God’s creative intention” still does not justify or explain the countless deaths and 
suffering of animals, which are far more than necessary for a long evolutionary development to 
occur. Animal suffering began over 250 million years ago without any interference from God, 
and its only possible purpose would be discovered through the theory of evolution, the survival 
of superior species. New species gradually evolve, partly as a consequence of innumerable 
deaths and suffering. (An animal’s sudden death might cut a few years from its life, whereas a 
human’s death could cut far more years.) Darwin noted that the suffering of millions of members 
of the lower species throughout time cannot be reconciled with a God who is infinitely good.19 
An omnipotent God could have permitted fewer animals to procreate, thus reducing their vast 
multitude and their demise, as mentioned earlier.
     Chartier admits that process thinkers, but not necessarily process theists or what he calls 
zoophiles, maintain that God sometimes wills the predator’s actions as well as those of the prey. 
They argue that predation is not morally wrong (in that animals are amoral beings), and it is 
consistent with God’s absolute omnibenevolence. We are challenging the latter idea that God’s 
omnibenevolence is sancrosanct.  Consequentialist zoophiles argue that when God lures 
predators into predatory actions, his goodness is not questioned because those actions contribute 
19 Murray, M.J., Ross, G.  (2006)  Neo-Cartesianism and the problem of animal suffering.  Faith and Philosophy. 
23:2,  p.169.
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to evolutionary advance. Process theorists realize rightly that it is easier to defend predation than 
to justify sport hunting (see n 22.) Chartier understands that this view challenges the idea that 
God loves animals as individuals. I return to this important point later.
     The consequentialist view is that God is concerned with the sum total of goodness in the 
world, and this goodness or love may or may not lead to protecting animals and humans. We 
agree to the extent that his goodness or love is for the whole species or genus (until it is extinct), 
not for the individual. The process theorists (not theist) want to argue that when predation is 
undesirable or unwanted, then it occurs against God’s intentions, and when we desire predation, 
then it is as God wanted. We can object that this is having it both ways, so that God conveniently 
enables the process thinker’s position. And what if environmentalists are against the wolves’ 
predatory killing of their prey but ranchers favor it? Which side is consistent with God’s will? 
The question is impossible to answer and is purely speculative.
     Process theists (zoophiles) can also argue that innumerable animal deaths, especially 
predatory deaths, are part of God’s plan to create humans who are capable of more subtle and 
valuable experiences. Only through predation can higher life forms emerge into existence as 
evolution progresses onward. This evolutionary stage of development toward more intelligent 
species that are capable of greater pleasures (and harms), and richer experiences is supposed to 
justify countless harms and deaths to animals (some Christian and process theists argue), but 
Chartier is right to oppose this view.
    According to Chartier, the process thinker can claim that God suffers with all creatures. He 
knows their suffering from the inside. “Thus whenever God brings about a risk for a creature, 
this is also a risk for God.”20 Any creature’s suffering will also be God’s suffering. This suggests 
that God is empathic, which Chartier states without argument. For people who already believe in 
20 Chartier, G.  Non-human animals and process theodicy. p. 6.
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God, “the fact of divine suffering” shows that the suffering had good reasons and it is a risk 
worth taking. But if God is suffering, then we can have no idea how to understand, appreciate or 
truly know that with reasoned assurance. In any case, it would be radically different from human 
and animal suffering. Suffering suggests vulnerability, anguish, and much sensitivity, but these 
are clearly animal and human attributes, and we cannot know that they are divine. Contrary to 
process theism, if God is transcendent and outside time, then it seems not logically possible for 
this divine being to experience the feeling of suffering. Most likely, it is logically impossible or 
contradictory for a transcendent being to exist beyond the sensory world, and yet also partake of 
experiences within it. Besides, if God possesses total power, then he could easily protect himself 
from any suffering or risks in the universe. If he is omniscient, then he would probably have a 
priori knowledge (very generally), of the experience of sentient suffering, and thus it would be 
unnecessary to actually experience it. Truths a priori (e.g. mathematics) are more fundamental 
and primary forms of knowledge, as the rationalists have shown, and do not require secondary 
empirical contingent truths.
     A suffering God also implies that he is so caring that, if possible, he would wish to experience 
and understand human and animal suffering.  Besides, suffering suggests God has sympathy, but 
that is a human and perhaps animal attribute, thus Peter Geach’s claim that God is non-
sympathetic is more plausible.21  In the end, he argues that because God does not care about 
animal suffering, then there is no justification for animal evils. We can question whether true 
loving must include sympathy. (See Lynch, J.J., cla.colpoly.edu/~jlynch.html.) Moreover, 
regardless of whether God is omnipotent or not, there is no evidence or strong argument for the 
21 Geach, P.  (1977)  Providence and evil.  New York: Cambridge University Press, p.80.  
Geach approves of Hobbes’ assertion that God’s almightiness is a sufficient justification for his infliction of pain on 
humans; it also raises no more of a problem than pains to animals, p.109.
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claim that God suffers. (Some Christians may cite Christ’s crucifixion.) In any case, divine 
suffering is beyond our knowledge and remains an enigma.
   The central problem has been noted: process theodicy tries to resolve the problem of evil by 
claiming that God’s power is only persuasive not coercive.  Humans and animals can ignore
 God’s persuasion and act as they wish.  But this is not an answer or solution for the theist who 
strongly believes in God’s absolute and total omnipotence (p.6) Persuasion without full power is 
simply not omnipotent. Kings who can only persuade their subjects to follow their desires lack 
power, and that is still true even if that is the only power in the Kingdom.  It is strange, indeed, to 
believe in a God who cannot control and coerce small animals such as mice. A God who cannot 
coerce and command small animals who possess, at most, trivial freewill  is a far lesser God and 
is closer to a mere deity. Most theists cannot accept this premise, even hypothetically, because it 
is not consistent with their worldview and religious convictions. Therefore, the process thinker’s 
concept of a God who lacks omnipotence fails to provide a solution or adequate answer to the 
problem of evil. Other theological problems arise regarding process thought and none can be 
easily resolved. Process theism does not depend on particular empirical data, Chartier states. 
Obviously-- that data are not likely to support their position or are irrelevant.  Process theism and 
theory deserves a more complete critical analysis.
     We have seen that the attempts to answer and/or understand the problem of evil and animal 
suffering from the theories of John Hick, Richard Swinburne and the process thinkers (or theists) 
are not totally adequate to the task. Misunderstandings of animal life flaw their arguments. My 
argument which follows is a radical attempt to rectify these theories by departing from the 
standard concept of God’s love or goodness toward animals and humans. It is an answer (but not 
a true solution) to the problem of evil. That is, a metaphysical road away from traditional theism, 
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but which can be consistent with liberal theistic approaches and perhaps to deism. I reinterpret 
the status of animals and their suffering, and the old view that humans are necessarily superior to 
them.
                                  Human Reasoning, rights and animals
  Consider that the lives of wild animals are filled with fear, hunger, suffering, and often a 
miserable death from predators or natural disasters, as Hume had Philo argue in the Dialogues  
Concerning Natural Religion. They try to survive the worst weather conditions, natural disasters, 
and from hunters and poachers throughout the world. Only the most ardent and caring animal 
lovers provide some assistance to a very small number of animals. The most loving 
knowledgeable person would never interfere between two animals in the wild, fighting to the 
death. Certainly, some small animals are saved and some large animals are salvaged and cared 
for, usually in captivity or in zoos. Yet these exceptions are an infinitesimal percent of all 
animals everywhere. They suffer but their cries are usually not heard or answered by the most 
kind and dutiful people. If they could reason, they would wonder why the powerful humans do 
nothing while they suffer and die. Dogs and cats in shelters might reason (if they could) why 
these humans who seem to care and provide minimal survival and comfort, put them to death and 
allow them to suffer in cages for no particular reason. They would ask, as Job did, why do we 
deserve this fate? It is not a stretch of the imagination to suppose that they perceive people as 
gods (or devils?), albeit imperfect ones.
     Moreover, human understanding of divine attributes is meager and extremely difficult to 
comprehend in that we possess a tiny but significant knowledge of the universe. Let us suppose 
that God (if he exists) regards people roughly as we regard wild animals, and to some extent, 
unwanted domestic animals. God is as unlikely to interfere in a natural disaster or criminal act as 
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people would between two wild animals. Suppose that Smith truly loves all animals and has the 
strength, weapons and skill to stop one animal from attacking another. Despite his strong 
feelings, he would refrain, and view the situation as an example of nature’s course and that he 
has no duty or obligation to help. This is the Way of Life and the natural order alone determines 
who lives and dies. If the most ardent animal lovers knew in advance of the deaths or suffering of 
wild animals, the vast majority would still be untreated and left alone, despite human sympathy 
and abilities to prevent it. Yet it is not absurd to expect that some caring individuals might 
interfere to rescue prey from their predators for purely altruistic reasons. In many cases it would 
arguably be morally acceptable and even obligatory if a special bond with a wild or domestic 
animal caused one to prevent it from killing its prey, or rescue the prey from being killed. If I 
stop a rabbit or bird from predation without harm to the environment or other animals, then it is 
surely acceptable, as long it does not become a systematic practice which would upset the 
ecosystem. The predator will find other prey and continue on the prowl. In this way, the 
argument used by sports hunters to challenge human interference with animals in the wild fails.22
     Brian Luke refers to Cowen and Sapontzis who argue, agreeably, that we should interfere 
against natural predation when it would reduce suffering and/or when the costs are low. Luke’s 
case that predation is not an evil is weak. The arguments he tries to rebut (pp.109-115) 
convincingly show that predation is a good only to the predators, not to the prey, nor necessarily 
to the ecosystem, or in itself. It is certainly an evil when an animal devours a human, though it is 
a “good” to the predator. Luke acknowledges that animals, in many ways, are more sensitive than 
humans and feel certain things more intensely than us. Furthermore, the argument that predators 
22 Luke, B.  (2007)  Men’s hunting and the disvalue of natural predation. In H-L Li, A. Yeung (Eds.) New essays in 
applied ethics.  New York: Palgrave, Macmillan.  pp. 104-105, 117.
Sport hunter advocates claim that arguments of animal rights proponents are, perhaps, hypocritical.  The pro hunting 
argument claims that if hunters are at fault for inflicting pain on animals in the wild, then animal rights proponents 
should consider preventing predation in the wild, but that seems absurd to them.
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keep the prey’s population from rising excessively is often untrue. So, too, the idea that predators 
prevent the prey from the worse evil of starving to death is often incorrect. Luke’s explanations 
of the opposing arguments are much stronger than his rebuttals. Thus, predation (in most cases) 
is an evil and sport hunting is worse yet.
     Naturally, humans possess a moral conscience, high powers of intelligence and language, and 
ostensibly, this makes all the difference between man and animal. Humans understand moral 
agency and have moral standing whereas animals do not. Traditionally, with these attributes 
come human rights, especially the right to live, whereas animals cannot understand rights and are 
presumed to have none. Nevertheless, several philosophers, psychologists and biologists 
extended the Bill of Rights to the great apes, even if they could never defend themselves nor 
understand rights. Perhaps the question is whether the animal understands and respects other’s 
rights and assumes responsibility for his or her actions?23  Zoologist Marc Hauser claims that if 
the apes do not, then they are only moral patients, not moral agents, and it is difficult to ascertain 
whether they feel the actual obligation to perform certain cooperative actions. 
     While this distinction is crucial for humans, clearly no empirical evidence or logical proof 
exists to show that God holds the same view as it is impossible to know or verify. Nevertheless, 
it is a strong possibility that God overlooks this moral distinction and that it is relatively 
unimportant to him. It is certainly not obvious or conclusive that moral status entails human 
superiority. Conversely, one cannot argue with any certainty that humans and animals are 
reasonably equal in God’s mind, primarily because he is unknowable. Where is the sufficient 
evidence, apart from the Bible, that this special moral distinction is the crucial one, above all the 
others, in the mind of God? This assumption has not been fully justified, or else it is an article of 
faith in divine wisdom.
23 Hauser, M.D.  (2006) Moral minds.  New York: Harper Collins. p. 414.
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    Of course, humans have an extremely complex brain, but it is questionable why this organ and 
the spiritual bond through prayer with God should cause him to prevent human suffering and 
unfair deaths. Although humans understand justice and have a meaningful purpose in life, this 
unique distinction may not be so special and overriding to God. Let us assume that God has the 
highest divine morality. As the absolute epitome of morality, he would have at least one moral 
duty to fulfill in the universe, and he certainly would and should perform it, and yet he fails to 
save or protect humans and animals from evils. There is no certain evidence to the contrary.  It 
follows, then, that this is not his prima facie duty. Assuming that he has at least one moral duty 
or responsibility, then certainly he would be negligent not to perform it. If it is not his prima 
facie duty, it might be a secondary or tertiary duty, but in either case, he is not performing it.
     I do not claim that all animals have rights, or that animals should be considered the same as 
humans or vice-versa. On the other hand, I suggest that primarily human arrogance and hubris is 
the source of spiritual superiority on the basis of moral and intellectual intelligence. Throughout 
history, humans have been a very vain species, full of conceit and arrogance for their own kind.
Arguably, ethical egoism is the chief motivator for the majority, if not all people. The peculiar 
reasoning that assumes that intelligent moral superiority is the overriding distinction, and then 
uses that as the criterion for rights almost begs the question or is at least suspicious. Assuming 
that Bentham is right, then suffering is a very significant shared capability that may well override 
the differences. Therefore, noninterference in human suffering is akin to our noninterference 
with animals both in the wild and among domestic animals.
                                  God’s Love for Humanity and Individuals
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     Despite this, God can still be claimed to love humanity as theists argue, but this love must be 
understood very differently, if it can be truly understood. Consider that animal lovers generally 
love animals as a whole in their entirety, (as well as some individual animals), or at least some 
species, but that does not commit them to loving each and every animal. So, too, Christians can 
still claim that God loves all men, but this must be taken as the human race, not every individual, 
otherwise theists could commit the division fallacy and contradict a central Christian tenet which 
holds that God loves every individual. This fallacy infers the nature of the whole or class from 
the nature of the particulars or attributes. It challenges common sense views that what is true for 
a totality (P) must be true for each individual or particular (Q), but logically and empirically, that 
is not always true. Philosophers are unlikely to use this reasoning, but other theists may very well 
do so. The division fallacy holds true whether the subject is theology or ordinary matters of fact. 
God’s love for humanity would not necessarily include or entail loving every single person. To 
avoid this faulty inference, we should realize and accept that his love does not and never did 
entail interference from all evils. If the Devil exists, his evil actions toward humans would also 
not entail evil directed toward each individual. 
     One might compare God’s love to a father loving all his children, as well as each child 
individually, but analogies from God to humans tend to be weak  and too anthromorphic because 
the father’s love is subjective, originating from mental states, behaviors, thought and speech. 
Divine love cannot be ascertained in the same way and cannot be demonstrated or verified with 
behaviors, speech nor mental states, notwithstanding dubious religious experiences. Parental love 
is unlikely to be an example of the division fallacy, but some interpreters of the Bible may very 
likely make this mistake. For instance, God’s love for the World (John 3:16) does not commit 
him to loving every person throughout time, especially not equally.
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   Furthermore, it is very doubtful that God loved Hitler, Stalin and every homicidal killer.  In 
these kinds of cases, it is extremely difficult to separate and distinguish God’s supposed love for 
a particular human from his criminal acts. To love the man only, divorced from his terrible and 
immoral criminal life challenges our credulity. When we consider all the countless violent 
crimes, unnecessary and painful deaths (moral and natural), wars, and other human suffering 
throughout time, it is apparent that these are not expressions of divine love. On the contrary, if 
anything, they present a picture of indifference, disregard, and lack of concern for these victims. 
Theistic belief in God’s love for them is obviously not supported by the overwhelming evidence. 
This irrational mode of thinking is an epistemic denial whose analysis is beyond my intentions.
    Moreover, we should question what sort of God would love Hitler (though not his actions), as 
he loves saints and selfless humanitarians. Furthermore, did God love all the Holocaust victims 
or was he merely indifferent? Obviously, permitting them to suffer horrible deaths hardly 
expresses sufficient caring or love. This momentous tragedy shows that God did not love every 
human. Contrary to Swinburne, neither the “good” of their heroic struggles, nor peace in the 
afterlife, can ever justify the tragedy.24 The State of Israel was created after the Holocaust, but 
even this putative good does not justify the suffering, especially considering that only a small 
number of survivors benefitted from it. Some orthodox Jews and others say that this was God’s 
will, or that God was punishing Jews for becoming too secular or for assimilating, among other 
reasons. But these possible answers, even taken together, cannot explain the deaths of six million 
people. Moreover, this horrific event serves as evidence, I believe, that God does not love every 
person, but rather humans as a whole. The total systematic magnitude of the Holocaust has raised 
24 Swinburne, R. (1996) Some major strands of theodicy. In D. Howard-Snyder (Ed.), The evidential argument from 
evil.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press. pp.46-47.
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many new questions about God and man, which deserve another lengthy paper. Jewish 
theological opinion is divided on the Holocaust.25
By modus tollens,
1. If an omnipotent God loves all persons, then he should prevent their suffering and unnecessary 
deaths.
2. The unnecessary deaths and suffering are not prevented.
 (An omnipotent) God does not love all persons.
      It is often argued that evil actions can be explained by human freewill, and that without it we 
would not be truly human. Hick argues that humans, by definition, cannot be totally good (do the 
right thing) or be unfree like moral robots without sacrificing their humanity. But the skeptic 
does not demand that the agent always do the right thing—only that God should permit less 
terrible evils, even if that entails somewhat less freewill. It is not all or nothing, and apologists 
who argue that create a false dichotomy. If God had stopped Hitler, Stalin and others from 
exercising their freewill, he could have prevented many millions of innocent people from 
unnecessary death and suffering. Some of these lives would have improved the health and well-
being of their nation and the world.  God with his power and knowledge could and should have 
created humans with less violent evil desires and with a stronger altruistic conscience. At the 
very minimum, he could have prevented the Holocaust and other genocides. Most skeptics do not 
expect him to prevent every war or grisly death, though we can hope that he would. Furthermore, 
if humans were created with less evil intent or slightly less freewill, this image of humanity 
25 Theologians have argued that God could or would not interfere with the Nazi’s freewill. Martin Buber and others 
have been silent on the Holocaust, and believe that it does not necessitate a special response.  Others cite Biblical 
passages (such as Daniel 12) where God seems to foresee a distant terrible tragedy. Influenced by Nietzsche, 
Richard Rubenstein claims that the Holocaust (Shoah) demonstrates that God is dead and that no viable answer is 
satisfactory.  This existentialist response has been sharply criticized by other Jewish theologians.  Rubenstein offers 
instead a radical secular opinion which announces the final death of God.  He concurs with Sartre and Camus on the 
human condition, however unlike them, Rubenstein is not an atheist.  He believes that it is important to promote a 
religious community, especially after the death of God.  Logically, it is difficult to assess his book because it is 
essentially a testament to Jewish beliefs and historical background, rather than a sustained argument.
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would be accepted as our true human nature and human beings would be merely defined 
differently. We would not think that we were less human because of that change. J.L. Mackie has 
rightly argued that all forms of the freewill defense fail.26 
     Contrary to Mackie, though, God’s omnipotence need not be restricted, at all. Omnipotence is 
necessary for God to control and create the universe, but his love for every individual, especially 
mass murderers, is certainly not a necessity.  If God is said to be the creator and sustainer of the 
whole total universe, then we can infer that it is necessary for him to be omnipotent and 
omniscient, but logically, this creation does not(and should not) entail that he is all loving.  It is 
not imperative for God to be loving or caring in order to create, sustain and know everything in 
and about the universe. In order to be the creator, God must have the knowledge and power to 
sustain life on earth, ultimately, but love is not a necessary attribute of his being. Certainly, there 
is no shred of evidence of it. Obviously, such love is comforting and provides great emotional 
support, and though this is a strong widespread intuition and feeling, it does not imply or in any 
manner demonstrate a logical reason. 
   Consider this analogy.  Imagine that God watches us from high above as if civilization was a 
long parade. He loves the parade, but does not need to recognize each individual’s movements in 
order to maintain such love. We might watch animals from a high tower, seeing their beauty, 
playfulness, grace and innocence. We admire and “love” them, but our interference with their 
pain does not necessarily follow. In this context, love is defined as the Biblical agape or charity. 
God loves the animal species or genus, but not individual animals or their families, and if 
evolution drives it extinct, then arguably, he still loves its phylum. His love toward them is 
26 Mackie, J.L.  (1990). Evil and omnipotence.  In M. McCord Adams, R.M. Adams  (Eds.) The Problem of evil. 
New York: Oxford University Press. pp.33-37. (See also Mackie, J.L., The Miracle of theism)
Also see Trakakis, N. (2008) Theodicy: the solution to the problem of evil, or part of the problem? Sophia, 
47:pp.161-191.
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limited (qualified) by the forces of the vast evolutionary time. This can partly explain the billions 
of creatures killed in their brief lives over time. One might say he had charity for the whole and 
malice toward none. So, we infer that he loves the bald eagles, all eagles even more, and birds, 
generally even greater.
   Moreover, God’s love for each particular creature commits a reductio ad absurdum. The 
argument would follow: If God loves every creature (perhaps excluding insects?) does he then 
love every mouse, rat, slug and worm? Consider that each worm is almost indistinguishable from 
another and that they have numbered in the trillions or more ever since the Cambrian era. What 
could it mean, and what is the likelihood that God loved every particular rat and tadpole that ever 
lived? Obviously, it has no meaning to the animal and probably none to God. If he does not love 
every one, then how far down the animal kingdom does God’s love go? What are the criteria, if 
any, for loving every particular creature? Does he love only animals that have a rudimentary self, 
or are conscious, or have a nervous system, or that experience pain or suffering? Of course, we 
can have no true knowledge of these answers.  It is absurd indeed to argue that God loves (has 
charity) toward every rat or tadpole, especially since they die so fast and are a minute blip in 
time. 
     My answer to the problem of evil provides a reason for animal suffering and death, and forces 
us to take the problem seriously. Probably few theists will accept this general approach to the 
problem of evil because it places humans on the level of animals in regard to this answer, but 
logically, the truth of the matter does not require widespread acceptance.
     Basil Mitchell offers a useful approach with his parable of a partisan, Stranger and a war.27 
The Stranger, who represents God, assures the partisan (who represent the theist) that he is on his 
27 Mitchell, B. (2006).  A debate on the rationality of  religious belief.  In L.P. Pojman  (Ed.) Philosophy – the quest  
for  truth 6th ed. (pp. 148-149).  New York: Oxford University Press.  Originally in A. Flew, A. MacIntyre (Eds.) 
(1955) New essays in philosophical theology.  London: SCM Press.
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side, but then is seen aiding the partisan’s enemy. Friends question whether the Stranger is really 
on their side but the partisan insists that the Stranger knows best, and does not waver from his 
belief or faith that the Stranger loves him. Mitchell’s question can be rephrased:  “what would  
have to happen for the theist to change his mind, and see that God’s love for all men does not 
entail loving each and every man?” What else is required besides this total lack of evidence? 
What more is required to accept the idea that God does not distinguish between man and animal 
on earth? As Mitchell shows, if the theist has no plausible answer, then perhaps his belief is not 
rational, and it is either an article of faith only, or a vacuous formula that expresses a need for 
reassurance. 
    It is important here to point out a significant causal connection between faith, reason and 
religious belief. Religious belief usually arises from faith, and is unlikely to arise from logical 
argument.  Problems develop when logical reasoning is expected to validate and strengthen 
beliefs from faith alone. Moreover, it is doubtful that argument can seriously alter or persuade 
beliefs that originate from non-rational sources, especially deep emotions such as fear.  As 
Jonathan Swift said, it is impossible to reason someone out of something that he did not reason 
himself into in the first place. Some adamant theists have a faith without limits which strongly 
influences most or all of their beliefs. Their faith possesses a special priority over their belief 
system. However, the skeptic can argue that if faith acts as the trump card then anything can be 
asserted in its name. That is, if faith is the sufficient reason and basis for belief, then innumerable 
beliefs can become acceptable precisely because no shred of evidence is expected. In theory, 
virtually any assertion about God could be believed. If we use Popper’s falsifiability principle, 
when, if ever, do these “rational” statements of faith become irrational, unreasonable or false? 
What could make them false? We can also ask whether there are any assertions in the Bible that 
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orthodox theists would not accept. The expression of stubborn, perhaps naïve faith, skeptics 
claim, is no justification for rejecting or accepting universal truths, and instead appears as the 
epitome of ultimate wishful dreaming and hope. For instance, Holocaust survivors tenaciously 
held their beliefs in God even after they were freed.
    Similarly, belief in Heaven (such as Hick’s) has rarely been directly challenged in the 
literature largely because of its origin in faith. Skeptics argue that belief in Heaven originates 
from a need for reassurance, rather than expressing metaphysical a priori truth. Of course, the 
fact that theists so strongly desire it does not make it true, as John Stuart Mill rightly argued28 
and yet this deep-rooted common fallacy is very intractable. Swinburne and many theologians 
argue that God has good reasons to permit evils for the benefit of greater goods, e.g., Heaven. 
Interestingly, though, theists rarely acknowledge the opposite: often good events bring about evil 
ones.
    Regardless, it should be too large a gamble for humans to accept a miserable death for the 
prospect of an unknowable afterlife. Besides, this faith in Heaven might decisively influence the 
million people who commit suicide every year. Hick realizes that this is a puzzling question and 
we can only guess at the answers, yet he maintains that the puzzle is not great enough to 
overthrow his theodicy. But this attempt to minimize the mystery is not acceptable because truly 
acknowledging the entire history of world evils would, arguably, overthrow all theodicies, past 
and present.
                                                       Conclusion
     In this paper, we have briefly examined Hick’s basic theodicy, and have shown that his 
answers to animal suffering are inadequate and somewhat erroneous. Swinburne’s later 
28 Mill, J.S. (1988). Utility of  religion.  In Three essays on religion. (p.70). Amherst: Prometheus Books.
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scholarship on animal suffering is partly based on the false premise that animal suffering in a 
natural disaster, such as fire, is necessary so that other animals can be forewarned to avoid said 
fires, but this suffering does not (and cannot) improve their character. Moreover, observations 
and studies show that even small lower animals consciously suffer and experience pain. Some 
process theists and thinkers, such as Chartier, defend a less than omnipotent God who can 
persuade but not coerce animals in the right directions. But this response does not offer a 
satisfactory answer to the animal or human problem of evil. I argue for a nontraditional view that 
God (if he exists) should be understood as loving humanity but not necessarily individual 
humans, in contradiction to traditional theism. One might claim that God is selective regarding 
whom he loves or that he loves no particular individuals.
    Similarly, God loves (has charity) for animal species or the genus as a whole, not the 
individuals, and this theory still maintains that he is totally omnipotent. We do not prevent or 
stop the pain and deaths of animals in the wild, in that it is an aspect of nature; so too, God does 
not generally prevent the pain, suffering and deaths of sentient beings. Ample evidence shows 
that animals experience considerable pain, suffering and deaths, far more than is necessary, 
especially considering the course of evolution going back to the Cambrian era. As Darwin noted, 
the suffering of millions of the lower animal species cannot be reconciled with an infinitely good 
God. Moreover, the belief that God loves every individual animal commits a reductio ad 
absurdum.
   The traditional view may be open to committing the division fallacy. My argument does not 
diminish God’s love; it only reinterprets his goodness as true for the whole. This answer is not 
intended as a solution to the problem of evil in its conventional form, though some theists and 
skeptics might accept it as such.
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     A theocentric approach to theodicy, rather than an anthropocentric one enables theists to 
realize the more radical view that humans are not the center of God’s world at all.  The 
theocentric approach drops the assumption and illusion that human good and happiness are 
consistent with God’s purposes. God’s ultimate purposes are an enigma. As Frederick Ferre 
wrote regarding theodicy in Gustafson’s Ethics From A Theocentric Perspective, “…once man is 
removed from the center of the moral universe, human judgments of value will no longer count 
as the measure of God’s righteousness.”29
     An anthropocentric approach that is humanistic has much merit, but it also includes the error 
of assuming too much about God’s purpose and plan.  As Ferre says, a theocentric approach 
recognizes that God’s ways are not to be measured by our standards of benevolence, nor should 
we expect God to produce “happy endings.”  Partly, this is because God loves humanity in a way 
which is not self-evident, nor does it entail loving each individual, or loving sufficiently to 
prevent serious evils.
    The way the problem of evil is framed is a puzzle without an answer acceptable to everyone. 
After all, it is one thing to want to hold that one is personally loved by God, and another to 
accept one’s life and choices as they are in stark reality without false wishful dreams and hubris.
29 Ferre, F.  (January, 1986).  Theodicy and the status of animals.  American Philosophy Quarterly, 1, pp 26-27.
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